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Abstract This contribution about the Netherlands to the
special issue [or: section] on volunteering and civic action
focuses on changes in public understanding and policy
perspectives. Developments since the second half of the
nineteenth century show shifting emphases on active
membership (based on associational life and typical of the
phenomenon of ‘pillarization’), active citizenship (based
more on an individual sense of responsibility and more or
less political in nature) and unpaid work (volunteering as a
gift to society and other people). Government policy over
the last two decades has focused heavily on ‘reponsibi-
lization’ of citizens, both as regards providing help to
others when they need it (unpaid work/informal care) and
in terms of their relationship with the society in which they
live (active citizenship). We expand further on the recent
notion of the ‘do-democracy’ as a populist and anti-polit-
ical way of doing things together on a small scale instead of
engaging in democratic controversies and trying to get a
grip on big issues.
Keywords Netherlands  Active citizenship 
Volunteering  Do-democracy  Responsibilization 
Populism
Framing Popular Engagement
The aim of this paper is to help in understanding the
development of dominant views on voluntary civic or
social and political involvement1 in the Netherlands, and in
particular the recent focus by Dutch politicians and advo-
cates of active citizenship on the concept of ‘do-democ-
racy’. The paper is more concerned with how activities are
discussed—framed, named, differentiated, loaded with
intentions and functions, appreciated—than with their
content and frequency. And it focuses more on how elites
in politics and media see voluntary involvement and how
this is reflected in public opinion, than on how active cit-
izens describe their activities and give meaning to them.
It is useful when looking at developments in the
Netherlands to distinguish between three different concepts
or traditions of popular engagement:2
1. Unpaid work: doing something job-like out of a
willingness to give up time for other people or society;
roughly the Anglo-Saxon concept of voluntary work.
2. Active membership: doing something extra in and for
an association or movement to which one belongs; the
traditional Scandinavian idea of volunteering.
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1 I will use the term ‘popular engagement’ in the rest of this paper as
an overarching term to describe voluntary political and non-political
civic involvement as proposed by Adalbert Evers and Johan von
Essen in the Introduction to this special issue.
2 See Dekker (2002). The subtypes are related to various types of
voluntary organizations as distinguished by Charles Handy (1997):
active membership is the core of mutual support organization, active
citizenship for campaigning organizations, and unpaid work for
service-delivery organizations. See Brudney and Meijs for further
differentiation and management implications. See Brandl et al. (2009)
for a careful analysis of different meanings of volunteering and their





3. Active citizenship: doing something out of a sense of
duty or responsibility as a citizen, as a member of the
larger community; at the core of German ideas about
Ehrenamt).
I will use this threefold concept of popular engagement
to describe changing practices and discourses in the
Netherlands from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century
in ‘Developments up to the 1990s’ section. After a brief
European comparison of types of engagement in ‘Inter-
mezzo: Civic Ideals and Activities in Comparative Per-
spective’ section, in ‘A Civil, Caring and Responsible
Society and Do-democracy’ sections, I will look in more
detail at the present situation and in particular the concept
of ‘do-democracy’. ‘The Problems of Depoliticized Active
Citizenship’ section continues with a discussion of
depoliticization of popular engagement in this concept, and
‘Outlook’ section concludes with a more speculative
reflection on the future of popular engagement in the
framework presented in the Introduction to this special
issue by Evers and Von Essen.
Developments up to the 1990s
I will very briefly summarize the history up to the last
decade in a number of broad, overlapping periods.3
1870–1960: This was the golden age of Dutch ‘pillar-
ization’, although it is less typical than the Dutch would
like to believe. ‘Pillarization’ is the vertical segregation of
different population groups along religious or political
lines. It is the result of bottom-up and top-down building of
associations and linking existing organizations into blocs.
Catholic organizations formed the most encompassing and
homogeneous pillar. The Protestants or Calvinists were
also strongly pillarized, but in several pillars, ranging from
a loose liberal Protestant cluster to several tighter orthodox
clusters. The liberals and the socialists formed smaller,
more partial pillars of their own as a reaction to the con-
fessional pillarization. The different pillars had their own
hospitals, burial funds, newspapers and broadcasting
associations, social and economic interest organizations,
women’s organizations, choirs and soccer clubs. Calvinists
and Catholics also had their own schools; the socialists and
liberals were content with the state schools. Private schools
existed long before pillarization, but they became impor-
tant organizations in the confessional pillars. From the
eighteenth century onwards, municipalities began founding
state schools and the national state became more involved
in education. Government gradually increased the support
for state schools, but did not provide funding for private
schools, arguing that state schools had a general Christian
character. This provoked opposition from Catholics and
Calvinists, who did not want to pay taxes for state schools
and also have to pay for their own private schools. Their
struggle for equal treatment of state and private schools
was finally rewarded by the ‘pacification’ of 1917, a his-
torical compromise between liberals and confessionals.
Liberals acquired universal suffrage, and confessionals
received full recognition and equal financial rights for
private schools in the Constitution of 1920. This laid an
important foundation for the ‘politics of accommodation’
(Lijphart 1968) with publicly funded private action as a
dominant modus in other fields and a growth model for the
post-war Dutch welfare state.
Pillars were the result of a great deal of voluntary action
(more so among Protestants and socialists than Catholics,
who were organized in a more top-down way, and liberals,
who probably felt less need to organize in order to realize
their goals). The pillars primarily mobilized ‘active mem-
bers’—devoted adherents—to be disciplined, to spread the
word, to perform all kinds of services for their community.
That was perhaps primarily the male role; women were
probably more involved in the unpaid work role, closer to
care in the private sphere; active citizenship was primarily
a role for the liberals/bourgeois outside the pillars. The
pillars linked forms of civic involvement and provided
civic education: people could start as a member of a reli-
gious youth organization or sports club and progress
through to board membership, become active in interest
organizations and end up as professional politicians. There
was no great tension between social and political
involvement, but there were clear gender roles.
1945–1975: Growth of the welfare state. Based on the
pacification and the confessional principles of subsidiarity
and sphere sovereignty, the development of the welfare
state after the Second World War led to the expansion of
publicly financed but privately delivered welfare state
services, such as health care, welfare work, housing and
media. Pillarization provided the organizational framework
for the development of the welfare state, with policy
guidelines such as the acceptance of extensive freedoms of
action of the pillarized organizations and proportional
representation and distribution of facilities between the
pillars. However, the successful partnership with a growing
welfare state was not without consequences for the func-
tion and character of the pillarized institutions. As service
industries, they modernized, increased in scale and pro-
fessionalized. The population secularized, and the ideology
and denomination of organizations became less and less
3 For these sections, I draw heavily on Dekker (2015), in which
references to the English and Dutch literature can be found. For other
histories of Dutch civil society and the voluntary sector see Burger
and Veldheer (2001), Habraken et al. (2013) and Brandsen and Pape
(2015). For more context see Lijphart (1968), Bax (1988) and
Kennedy (2017).
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relevant. The networks of pillarization eroded for this
reason, and also because ‘interpillar’ mergers and initia-
tives were considered necessary to improve the quality of
the services and to meet new, specific needs. As regards
volunteers, there was a transformation on the one hand
from active members to board members dealing with pro-
fessionals and on the other a much larger group of volun-
teer helpers working for professionals. Active membership
survived in the spheres of leisure, advocacy and politics,
but unpaid work became the dominant type of volunteering
in the major welfare state sectors of care, education and
social work.
1975–present: Reform and replacement of the welfare
state. In the 1970s, the legitimacy of confessional organi-
zations in a secularized country, the organizational and
professional autonomy and the costs and fragmentation of
services became topics of debate. The crisis in public
finances of the late 1970s and early 1980s led to efficiency
measures and further large-scale mergers, reducing the
autonomy of non-profits and leading to the disappearance
of many pillarized organizations. Reforms were directed
towards cutbacks in public expenditure, slimming down the
civil service, territorial and functional decentralization,
privatization and deregulation. Many non-profit organiza-
tions felt the need, or were forced, to reorganize, scale
down or commercialize due to the decreasing levels of
government funding. In addition, deregulation meant the
end of the non-profit monopoly in certain areas and gave
newcomers the opportunity to enter domains previously
dominated by monopolistic non-profits. Besides these
shifts between the types of organizations delivering the
services of the welfare state, recent decades have shown a
growing emphasis on the need to reduce publicly funded
professional services by encouraging pure private
arrangements, calls for more ‘self-responsibility’ and urg-
ing people to seek more support from their own informal
networks, and revitalizing old forms of mutual help and
encouraging new ones. Government and local authorities
also became more directly involved in stimulating volun-
teering. Churches, interest organizations and other volun-
tary associations became less effective for the mass
mobilization of volunteers and had to be supported and
compensated, including by publicly financed volunteer
centres (Van den Bos 2014).
I will return to these innovations in the next sections and
will conclude this section with a look at the changes in
political involvement. Until the 1960s, and up to the pre-
sent for shrinking confessional segments of the population,
political behaviour was very much a part of pillarization.
‘Doing politics’ was an integral element of running civil
society organizations. People first grew into positions as
amateur politicians, later progressing to full-time public
authorities through umbrella organizations and political
parties representing their pillar. Since the mid-1960s, we
might trace two phases of political participation.
1965–1990: This was a period of new political and
social movements, developed outside the pillars and often
heavily inspired by international topics and examples. This
generated new forms of political action (occupations, sit-
ins) and conflicts between activists and representatives of
vested interests. There was also a movement making things
more ‘political’ (the personal is political, lifestyle politics),
not only on the secular left, but also among churchgoing
religious people: the Third World, the environment and
nuclear weapons were issues for social and political action,
for changing individual behaviour, for community activi-
ties and protests. Besides this area of new politics, but
sometimes related to it, were attempts to democratize
official politics and formal institutions by introducing
consultation procedures in policymaking and giving a say
to clients of welfare state services. This created more
representative and consultative bodies with more formal
options for participation by politically active citizens.
1990–present: These are the years of growing frustra-
tion about democratization and consultation procedures:
they take a lot of time and are often used by the usual
suspects (‘higher-educated (sometimes angry) older white
men’), burdensome for the administration and ‘just fake’ in
the eyes of critical citizens. This is leading to new exper-
iments with interactive policymaking and ‘co-producing’
active citizens in smaller groups, but often with the same
frustrations. Politicians, however, feel the need to get more
‘ordinary citizens’ involved as a contribution to closing the
gap between government and people. Closing an assumed
widening gap was a major concern around 1990 and again
in 2002 (the revolt by Pim Fortuyn), and again about
10 years later, with Geert Wilders as the successful pop-
ulist polarizer of ‘the elite’ versus ‘ordinary people’. ‘No
votes in two national referenda in the Netherlands (in 2005
against the European constitution and in 2016 against an
agreement between the EU and Ukraine) demonstrate at the
very least widespread political discontent and perhaps a
gap, but not a new wave of political activism. They are
primarily successes by small groups of political entrepre-
neurs, helped by exploiting the possibilities offered by
(social) media. Part of the political energy of activists is
moving away from formal politics to advocacy organiza-
tions, initiatives to influence enterprises and consumers and
citizen initiatives. There are growing difficulties in finding
enough active citizens to be voted on to representative
bodies, etc.
Summarizing the developments so far, it can be said that
popular engagement was heavily encouraged as a means of
active membership in the pillarized society. Volunteering
continued to be an important part of Dutch civic life—and
has kept the Netherlands in a top position internationally as
76 Voluntas (2019) 30:74–85
123
regards the number of volunteers (Dekker 2013)—after the
pillars and voluntary associations had lost much of their
strength. Volunteering increasingly developed into unpaid
work, with strong development of active citizenship from
the 1960s onwards in separate spheres of new politics.
Intermezzo: Civic Ideals and Activities
in Comparative Perspective
In this section, I will present quantitative information from
two European population surveys which place popular
engagement in the Netherlands in a comparative perspec-
tive. First of all, the ideals of citizenship: how important is
the ideal of active citizenship and how has it changed?
Table 1 presents findings from the Citizenship modules of
the 2004 and 2014 editions of the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP). People were asked to say on a
1–7 scale (transformed into 0–100 for Table 1) how
important they felt nine features of good citizenship were.
In this and the subsequent tables, the features are ranked
according to their average importance in the countries
included in the table. Besides the Netherlands in both
years, all other countries in this special issue are included
for 2014. To make it easier to compare the relative
importance of the features, I also show deviations from the
national average.
In the two Nordic countries, voting is the most important
characteristic of a good citizen; in the other countries, it is
obeying the law, including tax obligations. Neither boy-
cotting and buycotting nor international solidarity is seen
as great civic virtues by most people in the seven countries
studied. ‘To be active in social and political association’ is
the least popular everywhere.4
Comparing the public in the Netherlands between 2004
and 2014/15, there are no major changes, but there is rather
more support for obeying the law and less support for some
other aspects. There is definitely no swing to more active
citizenship; being active in social and political organiza-
tions is still at the bottom, and critical consumerism and
voting slip down the rankings somewhat.
In Fig. 1, we compare two rather low threshold mea-
surements of volunteering and political involvement. The
volunteering might include political activities and what is
called ‘political activities’ include consumer behaviour and
might include non-political associational involvement.
However, overall, the figures will tell us something about
the amount of popular involvement and whether there is
more stress on volunteering or on civic action and politics.
The regression line in Fig. 1 divides the more social/
volunteering countries from the more political/civic coun-
tries. Of the countries in the special issue, the Netherlands
is the most social, Sweden the most political country.
A Civil, Caring and Responsible Society
The idea of civil society has been heavily promoted by the
government in the Netherlands in recent decades, but with
different meanings. On the one hand, civil society is simply
seen as non-government, where ‘self-responsible’ citizens
are expected to look after their own affairs, without public
help. On the other hand, and more important today than a
few years ago, civil society is presented as the ideal of a
‘caring society’ or a ‘big society’, in which people feel
more responsible for their fellow citizens in need and for
their neighbourhoods.
Ideas of a ‘caring’ and ‘responsible society’ have been
part of the Christian-democratic ideology and agenda since
the 1980s. ‘Civil society’ became the ideal of liberal and
labour politicians alike in the 1980s and 1990s, in part as
an alternative framing of the corporatist ‘societal midfield’
colonized by former pillarized organizations and the
playing field of the Christian-democrats, but increasingly
seen as an alternative to government involvement and to
publicly funded facilities and care. Driven by ideological
motives, lack of public money, frustrating experiences with
broadening and deepening state-related democracy, a kind
of broad political consensus developed about the (actual/
preferable) very limited capacities of government and the
need to make ‘society’ stronger. In 2004, a government
policy paper (Cabinet 2004, p. 5) describes the ‘good cit-
izen’ as follows:
‘‘The government has in mind a citizen who is self-
reliant, mature and involved, not primarily turning to
the government to meet their requirements, com-
plaints and appeals, but rather in social self-organi-
zation and initiatives.’’
and introducing new legislation in 2004 on social support,
it states (quoted in Verhoeven and Tonkens 2013, p. 423):
‘‘The Cabinet would like to see people behaving
responsibly. This means taking responsibility
according to one’s own ability in a self-reliant way
and with as much choice as possible: to be aware of
the costs of services; care for fellow citizens; par-
ticipation in civil associations and volunteering.’’
4 We find similar results with similar questions in other surveys. In
the European Social Survey of 2002/03, six aspects were presented. In
the countries compared, ‘form their own opinion, independently of
others’, ‘vote in elections’ and ‘always obey laws and regulations’
competed for first place; ‘be active in politics’ was the least popular,
preceded by ‘be active in voluntary organizations’, which also scored
below average everywhere; ‘support people who are worse off than
themselves’ scored above average everywhere (Dekker 2013).
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The idea of ‘responsibilization’ of citizens has been at
the heart of policy changes this century (Tonkens 2011),
not just in the Netherlands (Trnka and Trundle 2014) and
not just in relation to social policies. Shamir (2008) uses
the term for the economic domain: government regulation
as a form of collective coercion is to be replaced by
responsible behaviour of individual firms. Shamir analyses
this as a moralization of the market and argues that this
further sustains, rather than undermining, neoliberal
governmentalities.
There is a strong emphasis on individual responsibility
in the Netherlands. Verhoeven and Tonkens (2013), com-
paring the British ‘Big Society’ with Dutch citizen-acti-
vating policy documents, find more ‘empowerment talk’ in
Britain and more ‘responsibility talk’ in the Netherlands,
often implying negative ideas about most citizens:
‘‘Dutch responsibility talk blames citizens, does not
grant citizens more influence over local matters,
sounds fatigued and dutiful, focuses on individual
citizens, and conveys a feeling that it is appropriate to
have negative feelings about other citizens, that citi-
zens should feel bad if they do not do the ‘normal’
thing, that participation is a duty, and that active
citizenship is about ‘you’ and ‘your’ contribution to
society.’’ (Verhoeven and Tonkens 2013, p. 423).
‘Self-responsibility’ has become a buzzword in Dutch
politics. It includes responsibility for other people, for the
neighbourhood, the natural environment, etc. It includes a
‘we-responsibility’, as long as the ‘we’ is a concrete social
entity or identifiable group and not the anonymous society
or the state.5 Another term used to stress this is the ‘par-
ticipation society’. It was used in the King’s speech at the
start of the parliamentary year in September 2013: ‘The
classical welfare state is slowly but surely evolving into a
‘‘participation society’’’. The term was received in the
media as something new if not revolutionary, but it was
actually used long before this by social-democrats and
Christian-democrats, and it is not really any different from
earlier ideas about a ‘caring’ and ‘responsible’ society.
The ‘end of the welfare state’ is an exaggerated inter-
pretation of recent developments, but things are definitely
changing. Most important for the majority of citizens are
the changes in social security schemes, pensions (financial,
Table 1 Importance of nine features of a good citizena in the Netherlands and six other countries in 2014/2015 (and 2004)
Netherlands Other countriesb 2014/15
2004 Dc 2014/5 DE DK SE ES UK US
(Average importance of all nine traits) (71) (72) (69) (72) (74) (79) (73) (77)
Always to obey laws and regulations 8 ? 10 12 12 10 8 18 13
Never to evade taxes 4 ? 10 13 11 11 12 18 13
To try to understand the reasoning of people with different opinions from your
own
11 – 8 4 4 4 6 7 2
To keep watch on the actions of government 6 6 0 – 1 7 – 4 4 8
Always to vote in elections 8 – 6 5 18 14 – 2 4 5
To help people in [your country] who are worse off than yourself 3 3 5 2 – 2 9 1 3
To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself – 2 – – 9 – 8 – 12 – 8 0 – 14 – 16
To choose products for political, ethical or environmental
reasons, even if they cost a bit more
– 17 ? – 15 – 7 – 12 – 7 – 6 – 14 – 12
To be active in social and political associations – 21 – 20 – 24 – 23 – 28 – 21 – 24 – 17
aDeviations from the national average for all nine traits on a scale from 0 (‘not at all important’) to 100 (‘very important’) in reply to the question
‘There are different opinions on what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally … how important is it …’. Features are
ranked according to their importance in the Netherlands in 2015. The most important feature(s) percountry is/are shown in bold
bThe other countries of this special issue: DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, SE = Sweden, ES = Spain, UK = United Kingdom and US = United
States
cSignificant changes (p\ .01) from 2004 to 2015
Source: ISSP citizenship modules 2004 and 2014 (in DK, NL and US some of the interviews took place in 2015), population aged 18 years and
older, weighted results
5 The ideas are very close to the notorious ‘there is no such thing as
society’ statement by the then British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher in 1987. It is worth looking up this statement made in an
interview in Women’s Own magazine (http://www.margaretthatcher.
org/document/106689). It was not a hyperindividualistic denial of
society, but an emphasis of the responsibilities of individuals and
social associations which now, 30 years later, would have been able
to appear in a Dutch policy paper without anyone batting an eyelid.
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retirement age) and financial arrangements for housing,
study, etc. The formerly tax-funded non-profit sector, aka
civil society organizations, has become more dependent on
other financial means or has to compete for public money
with commercial organizations.
Nowadays, both policymakers and citizens talk less
about volunteering than about citizen or civic participation
(‘burgerparticipatie’). The terminology of volunteers and
volunteering is still used for (1) what many people do in
sports clubs, etc. (some as active members, others as
responsible members/clients, not always voluntary but as a
membership condition) and (2) as something temporary
because ‘somebody has to do it’ (wash the dishes, write a
letter, etc.; it is less about ‘being a volunteer’). The ‘unpaid
work’ idea is nowadays more something for people who
are unable to do paid work: something to help reintegrate
them into the labour market, or as a community duty
expected from people who receive social assistance. Active
citizenship is perhaps the core identity of voluntary civic
involvement these days, but emptied of its political and
critical content. The ideal is self-reliant participation, not
policy-influencing participation. The first of these refers to
forms of participation which mainly involve people doing
something themselves, such as keeping their neighbour-
hood clean or keeping a service or amenity running. The
second is about exerting influence on the policy of a public
or private body, for example by voting, lobbying or exer-
cising the right to public consultation and participation in
decision-making. Current government policy in the
Netherlands is aimed particularly at promoting the former,
i.e. self-reliant civic participation.6
Summarizing the developments of popular engagement
until the 2010s from a dominant policy perspective, the
main change may have been a shift in focus from volun-
teering in general to voluntary (health) care (‘informele
zorg’/informal care7) and to neighbourhood activities
(‘burgerparticipatie’/citizen participation). The political
call to the population is in both cases about taking
responsibility for people and services in one’s living
environment.
Fig. 1 Involvement in volunteeringa and political activitiesb in The
Netherlands and 22 other countriesc in 2012/’13. aVolunteering: ‘In
the past 12 months, how often did you get involved in work for
voluntary or charitable organizations’? Reported are the percentages
answering ‘at least once every six months’. bPolitical activities:
‘There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or
help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months,
have you done any of the following? …’ Reported are the percentages
involved in at least one of the following five (from a list of seven)
possibilities: contacted a politician, government or local government
official/worked in a political party or action group/worked in another
organization or association/taken part in a lawful public demonstra-
tion/boycotted certain products. cThe other European countries in this
special issue (see Table 1) in grey. Source: European Social Survey 6
6 As has been noted in particular in the field of social and health care,
responsibilization and self-reliance are one side of the coin, the other
being intrusive policies aimed at people who behave ‘irresponsibly’.
See Tonkens (2011), who analyses simultaneous processes of
responsibilization and deresponsibilization in this field.
7 The vocabulary is somewhat confusing: caring activities are
‘informal’ from the perspective of health care professionals and
policymakers, but ‘formal’ from the traditional Dutch volunteering
perspective, where volunteering is by definition carried out for or
through an organization as opposed to unorganized informal help)
(see the indicators in Fig. 1).
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Do-democracy
A policy concept that is closely related to the reintroduced
notion of ‘participation society’ was also presented in a
policy document in 2013 (Cabinet 2013), namely the ‘doe-
democratie’ (do-democracy).8 Van de Wijdeven (2012)
used the term earlier in his PhD research on active citi-
zenship in neighbourhoods, where he identified different
circuits of people involved in political participation—ad-
visory boards, co-production of policies, protests—on the
one hand and groups of practical do-it-yourself people on
the other. He defined do-democracy9 as a type of partici-
patory democracy, in which citizens are ‘(co-)creating the
public sphere, not by deliberating, voting or bargaining, but
by realizing concrete projects in the public domain of their
neighbourhood’. Van Wijdeven’s study showed that tan-
gible activities appeal to citizens more than traditional
political activities. People involved in them learned new
skills, developed self-confidence and built new social
contacts. Working together to achieve concrete improve-
ments strengthened the social cohesion in neighbourhoods.
The eponymous policy document published by the
Dutch Ministry of the Interior (Cabinet 2013) describes
‘do-democracy’ as a new phase in the relationship between
citizen and government. After the civic policy consulta-
tions of the 1970s and the interactive policymaking of the
1990s, at the heart of this, ‘third generation’ of citizen
participation is doing things for oneself. According to the
policy document, this no longer ‘has to be done through the
filter of political representation’. In fact it goes further,
stating that politics and government should seek to engage
with active citizens, trust them and learn to ‘‘‘let go’’.
‘Do-democracy’ stresses ‘real’ activities as opposed to
‘just talking’, and polarizes active citizens versus bureau-
cratic government (often including politicians and repre-
sentative bodies). Important fields of activity for the do-
democracy are initiatives by citizens to take over public
facilities such as libraries and swimming pools, arrange-
ments to look after streets and parks, etc., but also setting
up cooperatives for wind energy and energy-saving pro-
jects, or cooperatives for home care and mutual support.
On the local level, coalitions of active citizens and politi-
cians/civil servants are trying to create more space for civic
initiatives. There are courses to teach civil servants ‘to sit
on their hands’, municipalities are supported by the
national Ministry of Internal Affairs to leave more to
citizens.
A recent meta-study of research on 125 citizen’s ini-
tiatives of grassroots organizations in the Netherlands
(Mensink et al. 2017) shows an enormous diversity, rang-
ing from small-scale arrangements for providing better care
and social services for family members and alternative
restaurants, via groups for managing green spaces and
playgrounds or offering support to undocumented immi-
grants, development aid projects independent of the large
NGOs in this field, or wind power and other sustainable
energy initiatives that are independent of vested energy
suppliers or involve more or less cooperative experimental
relationships. In many cases the core of the activities is the
delivery of services, be it as a critical alternative to public
and commercial services or as a means of coping with
cutbacks in mainstream amenities and services. Advocacy
and political action are secondary or not relevant at all.
Some might receive subsidies from central government or
use personal care budgets or social insurance funds to
finance their work, others might ask for contributions from
users or develop commercial activities; many will turn to
local authorities for some financial support or support in
kind. Most initiatives probably take the form of founda-
tions (a very simple legal device in Dutch law), but there
are also associations, and various authors have noticed a
growing number of cooperatives.10 However, there is no
way to take a reliable guess at the trends in total numbers
of initiatives and people and money involved (cf. Mensink
et al. 2017). Some reports give the impression of steady or
even explosive growth, but the frequently recurring and
identical ‘just examples’ and the complete lack of interest
in initiatives that disappear after a while make one some-
what sceptical about the supposed continuous growth. For
further qualitative analyses of citizens’ initiatives in the
Netherlands see Van Dam (2016).
In 2014 we published the results of empirical research in
five Dutch municipalities, all with above-average engage-
ment in promoting civic participation (Van Houwelingen
et al. 2014). We focused on the mixtures of self-reliant and
policy-influencing participation, and a short summary
might give a flavour of real do-democracy. Of the five
municipalities, one is encouraging its citizens, partly under
pressure from spending cuts, to take over responsibility for
maintaining public amenities, such as parks. Another has
8 The terms are sometimes used as interchangeable equivalents, but
do-democracy is a narrower concept focusing on voluntary civic
involvement, whereas the ‘participation society’ includes participa-
tion in education and the labour market.
9 But not using this term in English; his own translation of the title of
his book was ‘democracy of action’; later on he and others
(Verhoeven et al. 2014) wrote about ‘do-ocracy’ as it was used
before by Chen (2009) to characterize activism based on individuals
taking initiatives and responsibilities with informal coordination more
than formal democratic decision-making (cf. (Christensen and
Strømsnes 2010).
10 Contributions in Bokhorst et al. (2015) refer to various sources
showing growing numbers of—new registrations of—cooperatives in
(health) care, neighbourhood development, housing and sustainable
energy. However, the absolute numbers are still small, the scale is
small and the survival rate is probably often low. Therefore, new
cooperatives are still a marginal phenomenon.
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for some time worked with neighbourhood and village
teams made up of residents. The third, as part of the drive
for ‘self-governance’, expects local residents to initiate and
carry out projects as far as possible themselves. The fourth
is a shrinking municipality which feels it has no alternative
but to expect residents to do more themselves, such as
looking after community centres. The fifth has engaged in
an ‘austerity dialogue’ with residents to decide where
spending cuts should fall. The first four are clearly focused
on self-reliant civic participation, the fifth more on influ-
encing policies and political decision-making. From our
discussions with participants in these communities, we
have distilled a number of factors from these experiences
which appear to promote self-reliant civic participation:
necessity (if the government does not provide public ser-
vices and amenities, citizens have to take action them-
selves); degree of autonomy of the initiators and local
authorities; support by the government; and scale (initia-
tives are more likely to flourish at local level and on a small
scale).
Although we did find cases of small independent citi-
zens’ initiatives in our research and reports of others,
governmental and societal organizations and their paid
staff are mostly involved in one way or another. If they do
not initiate the initiatives, they facilitate them in many
ways, by offering office and meeting space, administrative
support, professional advice, links to people in power, etc.
There is a rich literature on civic participation projects in
the Netherlands, but it will be very hard to find sustainable
civic participation and initiatives without strong institu-
tional support from (local) government and non-profit
organizations. Even in quite secularized areas, churches
often play an important role as initiators and providers of
infrastructure for new private initiatives. It is surprising
that these organizations are barely mentioned in policy
documents about the ‘do-democracy’ or the wider ‘partic-
ipation society’. There might be formulations about ‘citi-
zens and their associations’, but the associations are
something abstract, a free choice by self-organizing indi-
viduals, not organizations with their own history and ‘as-
sociational life’. It is quite surprising how little reference is
made in the discussions to the history of citizen initiatives,
the social ties that stem from them within and alongside the
pillars, and the relationships that were established in the
‘societal midfield’ of private and semi-public organizations
between citizens and government. It is seen as mere history
by national policymakers, apparently irrelevant for the
present day. Their concerns are basically about government
and individual citizens.
At the local level there is clear policy interest for the
relationships between citizens’ initiatives and local
authorities, and much research has been done in this field
(e.g. Bakker et al. 2012; De Wilde et al. 2014). Here again,
the interest in long-term developments and institutions is
limited, however. The starting point is generally concrete
experiments and often relatively new citizen initiatives; the
chief sources of information are the most actively involved
citizens and their counterparts in local government. Little
research is carried out into the social structures in which
they are embedded and there is little opportunity to trace
what happens to the initiatives over time. Accountability is
recognized as an issue to some degree in policy documents
and in research reports about projects. Several small-scale
studies suggest that active and inactive citizens often agree
about what has to happen in their neighbourhood (Verho-
even et al. 2014, p. 12–13). Active citizens are aware of
possibly different wishes of non-involved citizens and of
possible negative external effects of their activities, and
they are keen to obtain support and try to be account-
able (Van de Wijdeven 2012; Bakker et al. 2012; Verho-
even et al. 2014). A dilemma for local government is
having to choose between overly onerous heavy forms of
accountability or no accountability at all (Blijleven 2016).
Coming back to our threefold concept of popular
engagement, from the perspective of ‘do-democracy’ we
see a strong focus in both government policy and research
(which is often dependent on that policy) on active citi-
zenship, with active membership being virtually ignored.
Volunteers doing unpaid work are somewhere in the
background of the policy documents and research reports:
necessary to make things happen but probably too depen-
dent on receiving guidelines and orders from genuinely
active citizens or (worse) paid professionals to be the real
heroes.
The Problems of Depoliticized Active Citizenship
In recent times, we have observed shifts between forms of
voluntary civic involvement, culminating in the promotion
of an unpolitical or even anti-political idea of participating
in a do-democracy. In Table 1 we saw that political
engagement plays a very subordinate role in the Dutch
public’s perception of good citizenship.11 It was certainly
11 Additional evidence can be found in Dutch research in which open
questions are used to ask what ‘a good citizen’ does and does not do.
The responses suggest that politics is even less important than when
measured with closed questions. If people are asked about voting,
they may conform to the moral duty, but to come up with voting
themselves is quite another matter, and less usual. According to our
open questions the most important quality of a good citizen is being a
social person: not being a burden to others, having a positive attitude
(tolerance, understanding) and also doing good for others. People
mention volunteering, more in an informal sense of helping others
than in the formal sense of doing things for or in organizations.
Besides this social side, there is the aspect of obeying the law, not
driving too fast, not committing crimes, etc. A large majority of
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not the case that politicians enjoyed greater esteem
between 2004 and 2015; on the contrary, turning out to
vote was considered less important for a good citizen and
obedience as a subject more important. The declining
significance of politics and government for a good society
has also characterized politics itself in recent decades. With
references to the blessings of the market and of commu-
nities, to the small margins of action for (national) politics
in the wake of Europe and globalization, and to the limited
successes and high costs of earlier government policy,
politics has made itself smaller and smaller and constantly
sought to temper expectations across a broad front (cf.
Crouch 2004).
In the ideal of ‘do-democracy’, a number of things come
together: resentment towards the overrepresentation of
highly educated people and the dominance of the usual
suspects in the talking democracy; broadly shared percep-
tions of the ineffectiveness of policy dialogue and con-
sultations; the need by the government to temper
expectations of politics, for example because of budgetary
problems and EU rules; and especially the desire on the
part of active citizens to make a real difference and to
develop collective responsibilities in their immediate living
environment.
Research at local level on the functioning of the do-
democracy (De Wilde et al. 2014; Van Houwelingen et al.
2015) reveals major risks and limitations, however. In the
first place, there is the risk that being forced to do some-
thing will put pressure on the traditions and values of
voluntariness and democratic choice. Several Dutch
municipalities have for example decided to close or stop
subsidizing libraries, swimming pools or other facilities.
Citizens were faced with these faits accomplis and their
only choice was whether to pick up the gauntlet or not.
That has little to do with democracy. Forced participation
to fill gaps in the council budget will also do little to
promote political engagement.
The second risk, as a corollary of the first, is cynicism
resulting from the perceived discrepancy between the
expectation that citizens will take responsibility and the
lack of responsibility and responsiveness on the part of the
administration. Residents in several Dutch municipalities
have been irritated by expensive projects carried out by the
local authority, such as the building of a new town hall
following municipal restructuring, leaving residents with
the feeling that their involvement in these projects was not
welcome and that the council was adopting a selective
approach. That again does little to promote local democ-
racy, and for that matter little for the willingness to
participate.
The third risk stems from the inherently limited scope of
the ‘do-democracy’. To be able to act and to avoid too
much talking, citizens get involved in limited, small-scale
projects. Expensive and interconnected facilities for pro-
viding education and care are beyond their reach, to say
nothing of questions such as income distribution, migration
and European integration. Those are too large in scale and
too complex for do-democracy, but are nonetheless sources
of deep discontent about political democracy. Decisions on
real political themes remain the preserve of politicians, or
else they highlight the impossibility of taking decisions
because of economic constraints, EU policies or interna-
tional agreements. Focusing on ‘making a difference’ in a
concrete and immediate way in villages and neighbour-
hoods runs a real risk of putting citizens at a growing
distance from wider society and the political world.
Of course, this is not an inevitable development. Do-
democracy has its tensions and contradictions as well. It
might not be so easy to set politically-influencing partici-
pation apart from self-reliant participation: active citizens
saving public money by doing things without reward are
sensitive to politicians wasting money. Small, non-political
local issues might not be that small and unrelated to big
issues. It might be difficult for people to completely avoid
politics when they become involved in helping refugees or
want to operate a wind turbine, for example. Bottom-up
initiatives might raise major controversies in local com-
munities, which representative politics cannot leave to ‘the
citizens’. One group welcoming refugees and another try-
ing to keep refugees out of the neighbourhood generate a
need for a civic dialogue about justice, the distribution of
the costs and benefits of local policies, etc. Unevenly dis-
tributed successes of self-reliant participation can lead to
discussions about compensating policies. New political
issues might arise because of unintended consequences of
successful initiatives, such as extensive use of public
money by new social entrepreneurs or unfair competition
between new initiatives and regulated and taxed
businesses.
Thus, apart from big political issues that cannot be
covered by do-democracy anyway, there are tensions and
challenges of do-democratic involvement which could
pave the way for a broader political engagement. However,
paving that way and staying on track for a longer period
will be hard work (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005)
because keeping things small and non-political is attractive
both for most politicians and many active citizens. Politi-
cians have an interest in defending their shrinking room for
manoeuvre against real popular political influence, and in
keeping citizens at a ‘‘maximum level of minimal
Footnote 11 continued
respondents do not mention either pure politics or the intimate sphere,
but rather attitudes and behaviours in the more or less public space in
between. The focus is on responsibilities towards other, less well-
known citizens and towards the community as a whole. Active
political involvement is not part of this (Dekker 2013).
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participation’’ (Crouch 2004, p. 112). People who want to
make a difference as ordinary citizens have many good
reasons to avoid politics—the (dirty) political domain as
well as the (weary conflictual) political debates (see the
Introduction to this special issue and Stoker 2006)—as has
been well documented in ethnographic studies of volunteer
groups (Eliasoph 1998; LeBlanc 1999; Bennett et al. 2013;
Guenther 2017; Malafaia et al. 2017).
Avoiding politics is at the heart of do-democratic
rhetoric: we basically want the same things (improvement
of facilities, a safe and clean living environment, etc.) and
if we do not agree on specific issues, it is better to look
pragmatically for a win–win solution than to embark on
debates about injustice and inequalities, and social and
economic conditions we cannot change anyway.12 Do-
democracy is also a deeply populist idea, assuming evident
common interests of ordinary people and the superfluity of
discussion, downplaying the need to find compromises and
to protect minority interests, ridiculing ‘elitist’ and ‘bu-
reaucratic’ intermediary institutions. It is quite surprising
that research on populism in Western-Europe is booming
but that the populism in civic engagement receives hardly
any attention. Most authors on populism seem to be so
obsessed by right-wing xenophobic populist parties that
they cannot see the broader populist undercurrent, also
manifesting itself in civic engagement and democratization
ideas traditionally closer to the left.13 Not so for Margaret
Canovan: after dealing with the radical populist mobiliza-
tion against partitocrazi in established democracies, she
formulates its affinities with radical democrats as follows:
‘‘… many of the themes of populism are eerily
familiar to any contemporary political theorist.
Where else have we come across furious revulsion
against pragmatic party politics and its compromises?
Where else schemes for returning democracy to the
grassroots and empowering the people? Where else
calls for transparency and directness in the relation
between popular will and democratic act, for the
overcoming of alienation? Where but in the theories
of participatory democracy that emerged out of the
radical movements of the 1960s and have dominated
philosophical discussion of the subject ever since?’’
(Canovan 1999, p. 15).
There is no room left for this in this paper, but broad-
ening the perspective it would be interesting to investigate
the similarities and differences between Dutch do-democ-
racy and ‘participatory populism’, as developed by Mat-
thew Rhodes-Purdy from studying Venezuela under
Chávez:
‘‘Participatory governance grants citizens not merely
a voice in politics but the ability to make some
decisions directly. Yet the scope of such programs is
inherently limited by geography: due to the difficulty
of enacting macro-level participatory governance,
such programs generally operate at the neighborhood
level. As a result, their policy domain is confined
mostly to basic-needs issues and community devel-
opment. … These programs allow populists to
devolve power, thus meeting their commitments to
empowerment and preserving the legitimacy of their
regimes. I call this strategy, where local-level par-
ticipatory governance is provided to legitimate
national-level populist hegemony, participatory pop-
ulism.’’ (Rhodes-Purdy 2015, p. 418)
Outlook
Let me conclude and get back to the three types of popular
engagement or voluntary civic involvement I started with.
Since the second half of the twentieth century we have seen
a shift from active membership, embedded in pillarized
associational life, to more individualized active citizenship
and more business-like organized unpaid work.14
As regards public policies, the main trend in recent
decades—definitely in terms of rhetoric and to a lesser
degree (and with contradictions) at the level of concrete
measures—has been from policy-influencing participation
to self-reliant do-democratic ideals, although there are also
attempts to further develop deliberative mini-publics.
Instead of supporting volunteering in general, there are
now diverging policy goals regarding (1) stimulating
informal care, merging informal help and formal volun-
teering into a broader category of unpaid work (a concern
for the Ministry of Health); (2) stimulating active citizen-
ship to run neighbourhood services (a focus of the Ministry
of the Interior); and (3) volunteering as a means of leading
people to paid work, in order to get something back from
12 The aversion to controversies is broader and can also be noted in
stressing the benefits of ‘dialogues instead of debates’ in the so-called
G1000 citizens’ summits, in which citizens discuss the biggest
problems in their locality (Boogaard and Michels 2016, p. 73 ff.).
These summits are seen as forms of deliberative democracy separate
from the d0-democratic framework.
13 The situation is different in the American populism tradition and
authors such as Harry Boyte and Peter Levine do use the term
populism as a positive concept of civic renewal (see Boyte 2007).
14 Active membership is still alive and may sometimes even be on
the rise in minority groups such as orthodox Protestants and
immigrant groups. Mosques and Christian immigrant churches often
play a central role in organizing social life and mutual support,
generating a lot of organized and informal voluntary efforts.
Initiatives may have the spirit of self-reliance of the old Dutch
pillars, but they are far too marginal, local and partial to see them as
part of new societal pillars.
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social security benefit recipients, to socialize school pupils,
to integrate refugees, as an alternative to imprisonment,
etc. (out of our scope because it is not really voluntary, or
not voluntary at all).
Political activism, once the protest wing of old pillarized
social movements and the core business of new social
movements and individual active citizenship from the
1960s onwards, has lost its lustre in recent decades. It is
perceived as ineffective and dismissed as being negative
rather than constructive. Political activism is still in the
toolbox of advocacy NGOs and it might still happen inci-
dentally to express public indignation, for instance in
(copies of) the ‘Occupy’ activities a few years ago or in
local protests against refugee centres. It is highly ritual, or
mainly a rapid outlet for anger, but as far as I can see is not
part of any new social and political movements. Instead
there seems to be a shift towards more activism on the
market, be it as producers (social entrepreneurs), con-
sumers (boycotting, buycotting), or combinations of both
roles (prosumers, energy cooperatives). On the other hand,
there might be more citizens’ initiatives and neighbour-
hood activities to take care of local communities, more or
less fitting into a do-democratic policy frame. In any event,
the upper left quadrant of the scheme (Fig. 1) developed by
Evers and Von Essen in the Introduction to this special
issue is not the place where I would expect to see many
active volunteering Dutch citizens in the near future. I
might be wrong, because the internal tensions of politics
avoiding engagement could lead to a re-politicization of
do-democratic involvement in neighbourhoods and in
providing local facilities. This is the politicization from
below scenario about which Evers and Von Essen specu-
late. But I might also be wrong because of another possi-
bility, namely mobilization and politicization from above
on global issues falling outside the do-democratic domain.
That might equally well involve ‘right-wing’ issues about
immigration and national interests, as ‘left-wing’ issues
concerned with economic inequality and sustainability
transitions. The upper left quadrant of Evers and Von
Essen’s figure might then be filled with followers of
political entrepreneurs and media visionaries, entirely
separate from the active citizens at the bottom right.
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